The New York Times

August 13, 1981,

Section A; Page 23

REVOLUTION AND MYTH

By Michael N. Manley

Historical turning points give rise to myths, and myths are an unsound basis for the understanding of world politics and the development of foreign policy. For example, it is a myth that Cuba sent troops to Angola because

Moscow ordered it. All the available evidence suggests that Moscow attached overriding importance at that time to detente and the strategic arms limitation negotiations and was completely taken by surprise by the Cuban

decision. It is unlikely that Moscow would have risked American anger over Angola. The Soviet Union's subsequent decision to support Cuba in its selfassigned role is a completely different matter. Common sense and my own extensive conversations with Fidel Castro on the matter satisfy me that the Soviet Union did not order Cuba into Angola. It is also a myth that Cuba spends its time plotting revolution throughout Latin America. Although

undoubtedly loyal to their allies in the Communist bloc, the Cubans take a very sophisticated view of both world politics and the objective conditions that make revolutions possible. In any case, the Cubans do not believe that

you can plot a revolution. They would regard that as an exercise for children. They believe that revolutions arise when a set of objective conditions, including gross oppression and a combination of forces capable of resisting that oppression, exist at the same time in the same place. I cannot speak of the early period; I speak of the Cuba of at least the last dozen years. The Cubans, as Marxist-Leninists, believe in the ultimate triumph of Communism

because of their view of the contradictions inherent in capitalism.

Moreover, President Castro is, myths aside, a man of extraordinary political sophistication, and being such, he is comfortable with pluralism. Most important, because Cuba is a small country, the Cubans are insistent on the

principle of noninterference in the affairs of others. Local Communist groups operating in progressive countries are not, in fact, encouraged by the Cubans to stir up trouble. I say this out of nine years of experience running a

traditional, Western-style, two-party democracy with a powerful private sector, which nobody was trying to eliminate. I also say this on the basis of conversations I have had with other heads of government in the Caribbean

region.

However, the Cubans draw the line somewhere. If Angola makes an appeal to them in a case in which democratic and progressive legitimacy are threatened by fascism, the Cubans will respond if it is within their means to do so. On the other hand, it is not true that the Cubans set out to persuade the Nicaraguan or Salvadoran people to fight for their own freedom. Support and paternity are not the same thing.

It is of particular interest that President Castro, along with Willy Brandt of the Socialist International, has worked for months toward a political settlement of the Salvadoran problem. President Castro publicly supports either the broadening of the Government to include the Democratic Front or the holding of elections. I know, because I was involved in some of the negotiations at various times last year.

The tragedy of today's situation is that the Reagan Administration is busily reviving all the old myths upon which American foreign policy was based in the 1950's. Vicious murderers like President Romeo Lucas Garcia of

Guatemala and supporters of apartheid become ''good guys.'' ''Bad guys'' are defined as those who are fed up with oppression and determined to do something about it.

The theory that sees Soviet and now Cuban expansionism at the root of popular revolutionary activity misconceives the nature of popular revolutions, underrates the quality of patriotism that inspires newly liberated people and

misunderstands a new kind of internationalism among third world countries, in which cooperation is seen as the answer to big-power domination and local tyranny alike. Add to this Cuba's deep sense of ethnic connection to

Africa and you will understand the decision to send troops to Angola -and Ethiopia.

A policy that flows from an analysis based upon myths is likely to be crazy. Action that flows from such an analysis is bound to be dangerous.

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Michael N. Manley, who was Prime Minister of Jamaica from 1972 to 1980, is the leader of the People's National Party. This article was excerpted from The Nation.