Grenada from afar
published in The Daily Gleaner: Monday | November 3, 2003 by Stephen Vasciannie

C.L.R. JAMES, the intellectual icon of the left, was the special guest speaker for the Cambridge University African-Caribbean Society in late October 1983. When James was invited he indicated that he would speak on the 'Former Colonial World'. But in the period between invitation and presentation, there arose the question of Grenada. The United States, along with some Caribbean forces, took part in an intervention, or invasion, in Grenada, following the killing of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several of his allies.

At the time, much of the world - outside the Caribbean - saw the intervention/invasion as yet another instance of American 'Big Power' politics. And so, when the president of the African-Caribbean Society introduced Professor James, the president called on the audience to stand for a minute's silence in solidarity with the noble people of Grenada who were struggling under the heavy boot of the imperialist.

C.L.R. James did not stand up. Mark you, he was about 81 years old at the time, and so, his response could have been interpreted as a symptom of age, rather than a political position. But, when he spoke, James indicated that he had his own reasons for not standing, thus driving out the age consideration. James spoke with his eloquent monotone on the former colonial world, highlighting his early experience with the Manchester Guardian, his cricket writing, and then gave the audience an excellent assessment of the political significance of Toni Morrison, Alice Walker and Ntozake Shange.

DISAPPOINTMENT

Notwithstanding the brilliance of his presentation, some listeners were clearly disappointed. One person pointed out that the title of the talk was the 'Former Colonial World' and asked whether in view of the Grenada intervention, we could not reasonably speak of the existing colonial world. Along the same line, another asked something about whether the Americans could find any way of justifying their actions in Grenada. But James would not be drawn: the most he would say on that evening in October 1983 was that Trinidad and Tobago had not sent troops to join in the Caribbean forces, and that the Trinidadians have close ties with Grenada.

The reasons behind C.L.R. James' delphic response to the American intervention on the Cambridge occasion were not readily apparent. Based on his life's work and political orientation, we can be sure that his attitude was instinctively anti-imperialist; and yet, he carefully refused to project the easy anti-American position that prevailed outside the Caribbean region at the time.

Based on James' own comments, though, we can surmise that he was bitterly disappointed about the execution of Maurice Bishop and company. In an interview following a presentation entitled 'Socialism or Barbarism', James was once asked about Grenada and its fight against imperialism. He responded as follows:

"Yes, that is a notable example, one in 10,000. I have been to Grenada, I have seen them at work. I think they are doing splendidly and that is the kind of thing that ought to be. But, may I tell you, my friend, most of the other governments in the Caribbean are not too sympathetic to Maurice Bishop, you know." (Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, p.45).

My suggestion, then, is that C.L.R. James was reluctant - in the initial stages at least - to condemn the American intervention in Grenada because he was profoundly disappointed with how Maurice Bishop had been treated. And, if this was James' position, he most certainly was not alone. There is some evidence that the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, was deeply saddened by the execution of Maurice Bishop, and there is overwhelming evidence that the people of the Caribbean regarded the execution of Bishop as simply unforgivable.

MAJORITY SENTIMENT

With the passage of time, there may be a tendency to underestimate the impact of Bishop's assassination on the majority in the Caribbean - that is probably understandable. And, hopefully, with the passage of time, the divisions that erupted in Grenada and in the rest of the Caribbean have been reduced. But, it would be unfair and unreasonable to forget the strong majority sentiment in the Caribbean following Bishop's killing.

People in Jamaica, who had never met Maurice Bishop, were in tears. The Government of Jamaica at the time recognised the strong feelings on the subject, and indeed, on one view of the events, called a snap election precisely because it wished to ride the crest of support for the Grenada intervention. In Jamaica, but for a small group that retained an anti-American line in all circumstances, and another group that had principled grounds to object to intervention, the intervention was popular.

But was it justifiable in principle? Following the intervention, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly against the action taken by the United States. Similarly, Margaret Thatcher must have surprised her strong ally Ronald Reagan when she conveyed her Government's "considerable doubts" about the intervention to the United States. These factors suggest broad state consensus that the intervention was contrary to international law.

JUSTIFICATION

In response, the United States and the Caribbean countries offered various arguments by way of legal justification. It was suggested, for instance, that the intervention was necessary to protect American nationals (at the St. George's Medical School), and that intervention to protect nationals is a recognised exception to the principle of non-intervention in international law. The problem with this approach, though, was that intervention to protect nationals - if it is indeed acceptable in law - must be proportionate to the circumstances. So, the Americans could have gone for the American students; but, intervention to protect nationals would not justify toppling the Coard/Hudson-Austin group.

Another argument offered, based on the collective self-defence provision of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Treaty, was also not entirely convincing. This treaty provided for collective self-defence against external aggression: it did not contemplate Caribbean States joining together to enter a member State that was not under external attack.

In the end, perhaps the strongest legal justification that the Americans could offer for the intervention was the letter of invitation signed by Grenada's Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon. To be sure, it has now emerged that this letter was signed following the intervention, so it is in a sense an ex post facto justification of the intervention. There may also be doubts about the constitutional authority of the Governor-General to invite foreign troops into the country.

But, notwithstanding these reservations, it is important to remember the reaction of most Grenadians to the intervention. It is beyond conjecture that most Grenadians saw the intervention as a kind of liberation; a shoot on sight curfew was brought to an end, and government selection by elections was shortly restored. Twenty years have passed, but it is important that we do not list the Grenada intervention simply as another example of imperialist excess. The matter was far more complicated than that.

Stephen Vasciannie is Professor of International Law at UWI and consultant in the chambers of the Attorney-General.